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1 Introduction
In many models featuring on-the-job search (OJS), whether a worker quits depends on the wage.
The effect of a higher wage on profits is twofold. First, the markup decreases, and second, turnover
is lower. These two effects move in opposite directions. The value function of the worker increases
with the wage only via the direct effect on flow income. Adding the profit function of the firm and
the worker’s value function gives the total match surplus, which is not a constant function of the
wage. With wage contracts the worker and firm values are then not perfectly transferable. In some
cases, profits can be locally increasing in the wage as the lowered turnover can more than offset the
cost of higher wages. Then both the profit function and the worker’s value function are increasing
in the wage. Under these conditions, it is not possible to apply a Nash bargaining solution (Nash,
1950) because the bargaining set is not convex (Shimer, 2006).
The literature has proposed different approaches to resolve this issue. Pissarides (1994) assumes
that turnover is fixed, which allows him to apply the Nash bargaining solution to a bargaining
problem with a convex bargaining set.1 Shimer (2006) takes the interactions between wage and
turnover into account. Instead of Nash bargaining, he uses an alternating offer bargaining game
in the spirit of Binmore et al. (1986). In this setting, there is an equilibrium despite the potential
nonconvexity of the bargaining set. However, the equilibrium in his model is not unique. When
the productivity of firms is homogeneous, there are two features to note. First, there exists a
continuum of equilibrium wage distributions. Second, given a wage distribution, the bargaining
solution within a match is not unique. These indeterminacies present a complication for applied
work.
My model features random on-the-job search, bargaining and renegotiation. The model extends
the work by Shimer (2006) to incorporate renegotiation and different bargaining powers. Wages
are determined by bargaining with alternating offers by the firm and the worker. Between offers,
there is an exogenous probability that this bargaining process breaks down. I consider the solution
of this model as the breakdown probability goes to zero. In the event of a breakdown, the worker
becomes unemployed and the firm’s payoff is zero. If an agreement is reached, the wage remains
1Krause and Lubik (2007) analyze a model in discrete time where wages are set in the beginning of the each
period, the timing restriction means that this is an equilibrium result. Similarly, in Moscarini (2005) when a worker
meets another firm the two firm engage in a auction for the worker. There is an arbitrary small cost to participate
in the auction and the equilibrium outcome is that the auction never occurs and the payoffs correspond to the Nash
bargaining solution treating turnover as fixed.
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fixed until the end of the wage contract when they bargain over a new wage. The end of the
contract arrives at a Poisson rate. In this model, the value function of the worker depends on both
the current wage and the firm’s type, and their relative importance depends on the frequency of
renegotiation. If there is no renegotiation, the worker’s value function depends only on the wage.
This compares with Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Shimer (2006). When the worker and the
firm renegotiate more frequently, and hence the contract length goes to zero, only the firm type
determines the worker’s value function. For an intermediate frequency of renegotiation, both the
firm type and the wage determine the value function of the worker. I show that, in this model,
the aforementioned indeterminacies in Shimer’s (2006) solution are avoided. The equilibrium wage
distribution is unique in my model, and given this equilibrium wage distribution, the bargaining
solution within a match is also unique.
The key aspect in my model is that the worker has two state variables, the wage and the firm’s
type. The frequency of renegotiation (determined by the Poisson rate) plays a key role in my
model: it governs the relative importance of the state variables to the worker, and the sensitivity of
turnover and match surplus to the wage. For instance, if the worker and the firm never renegotiate,
the length of the contract goes to infinity and turnover depends only on the wage. Instead, if the
worker and the firm renegotiate sufficiently frequently, the length of the contract goes to zero and
wages have no effect on turnover. If turnover is highly responsive to the wage, so is the match
surplus – then the worker captues a greater share of the surplus.
One of the equilibria in Shimer (2006) corresponds to a special case of my model in which the
worker and the firm never renegotiate and the bargaining powers are symmetric. On the other
hand, the payoff function in the model of Pissarides (1994) corresponds to another special case of
my model in which the worker and the firm renegotiate continously and the length of the contract
goes to zero. Then an important implication of the present paper is that, in models with continuous
renegotiation (also see Moscarini (2005)), the equilibrium can be desribed by the Nash bargaining
solution with transferable utilities. Therefore, this paper justfies the use of the Nash bargaining
solution with transferable utilities in the presence of OJS.2
In my model, the only commitment possible by the agents is to the wage during the length
of the contract. The main difference between this model and other models of wage determination
2In Coles and Mortensen’s (2016) model, firms have all the bargaining power and can continuously adjust the
wage, but the worker cannot observe the firm’s type. This is similar to Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Shimer
(2006) in that the worker’s value function only depends on the wage, unlike my model.
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with OJS is the type of commitment available to the agents. Wage posting models typically assume
that firms have all the bargaining power, and that the wages are set only at the time of vacancy
posting (i.e. no renegotiation).3 See, for instance, Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The wage is
chosen so that the marginal gain from hiring and retaining exactly matches the increased wage cost.
After hiring a worker, the firm has an incentive to change the agreed wage as it no longer affect
the hiring of the worker. Then the wages are not time consistent, as pointed out by Coles (2001).
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) also consider a case in which the firm has all the bargaining power.
But the firm is able to observe outside offers and make counter-offers. When the worker receives
an offer, the firm employing the worker and the other firm making the offer engage in Bertrand
competition over the worker. The equilibrium entails the worker moving to the most productive
firm and to receive a wage that leaves the worker indifferent to working at the less productive firm
for a wage equals its productivity. The wage thereby increases within a match as counter-offers
arrive. The model requires the firm to commit to the wage when the counter-offer expires.4
Section 2 defines the general model and expands on the contributions of the paper discussed
above. Section 3 provides a closed form solution in the case of homogeneous productivities. Section
4 concludes.
2 Model
There is a frictional labor market with a continuum of two types of risk neutral and infinitely lived
agents, firms and workers. Time is continuous and discounted at a rate ρ. Firms differ in their
type F , drawn from the standard uniform distribution. A firm matched with a worker produces
a flow output of x(F ), where x(·) is a differentiable and weakly increasing function. The flow
profit is given by production x(F ) minus the agreed wage. Workers are homogeneous but differ in
their employment state (unemployed or employed), the wage w and the type of the firm F . An
unemployed worker receives a flow benefit b and job offers at rate λu. An employed worker receives
a wage w and job offers at rate λ. The job gets destroyed at rate δ in which case the worker becomes
3Gautier et al. (2010), like Shimer (2006), consider a model where wages are set after the match is formed. The
increased retention is then the only reason to increase pay. Coles and Mortensen (2016) consider model where hiring
cost are independent of the wage the increased retention is then the only reason for increased pay irrespective of the
timing of wage setting.
4Dey and Flinn (2005) and Cahuc et al. (2006) extend this model to include bargaining where the threat point is
given by the best outside offer.
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unemployed and the firm gets no payoff. The wage in a match is renegotiated at a Poisson rate γ(F )
until which time it remains fixed, where γ(F ) is a weakly decreasing differentiable function. At
the time of renegotiation, a new wage is determined by bargaining with alternating offers between
the worker and the firm. We restrict our attention to Markov strategies in the bargaining game
and to equilibria in which the wage is weakly increasing in the firm type. w(F ) denotes the wage
that the worker and the firm type F expect from renegotiation. An equilibrium requires that, for
all F ∈ [0, 1], w(F ) is a bargaining outcome. Lastly, we assume that workers move if the worker is
indiffferent between the offer and the current job.
2.1 Value functions
Given the wage function w(·) that the firm and the worker expect, the value function for an
employed worker, W (F,w), is given by the expression
(δ + ρ+ γ(F ))W (F,w) = w + λ
∫ 1
0
max
{
E(F˜ , w(F˜ ))− E(F,w), 0
}
dF˜ + δU + γ(F )E(F,w(F )).
The value function for an unemployed worker, U , is given by
ρU = b+ λu
∫ 1
0
max
{
W (F˜ , w(F˜ ))− U, 0
}
dF˜ .
Define the excess value of a job to a worker as
V (F,w) = W (F,w)− U,
and the normalized outside value for the worker as
b¯ = b+ (λu − λ)
∫ 1
0
max
{
W (F˜ , w(F˜ ))− U, 0
}
dF˜ .
The value function of the firm, Π(F,w), is given by
(δ + ρ+ γ(F ) + λ(1−G(V (F,w))))Π(F,w) = x(F )− w + γ(F )Π(F,w(F ))
where G(V (F,w)) =
∫
{F˜ :V (F,w)>V (F˜ ,w(F˜ ))} dF˜ is the fraction of firm types with an implied value
that is strictly less than V (F,w). The measure F is normalized to only include productivity levels
that lead to matches. That is, the productivity satisfies x(0) > b¯.
2.2 Bargaining game
Here I describe the bargaining game and the payoff relating to the bargaining stage. Bargaining
occurs in discrete artificial time as in Shimer (2006).5 The players alternate in making offers. After
5For a treatment of bargaining in real time in a non-stationary search model see Coles and Muthoo (2003).
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the proposer has made an offer, the responder chooses to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is
accepted, the agents gets the payoff associated with the agreed wage. If the offer is rejected, we
move to the next period and there is a probability that this bargaining process breaks down. If
this process breaks down, the parties get their outside option. The probability that there is no
breakdown is (1 −∆)β after the worker makes an offer and (1 −∆)1−β after an offer by the firm.
β reflects the relative bargaining power of the worker. We define w∆(F )) to be the bargaining
outcome treating the wage distribution as fixed when the friction is ∆. I define w(F ) to be a
bargaining outcome if, for all  > 0, there exist a ∆¯ such that the difference |w(F ) − w∆(F )| < 
for all ∆ < ∆¯.
During the bargaining process, the firm and the worker treat future wage negotiations as fixed,
which means that the functions V , U and Π are fixed. The bargaining game consists of two players:
a firm with payoff function Π and a worker with (excess) payoff function V . The action set is R+ for
the proposer and {Accept, Reject} for the responder. A Markov strategy is such that the offer and
acceptance rules only depend on the type and not on the previous history. For i ∈ {w, f}, where
w and f refers to the workers and firms respectively, wi,∆(F ) denotes the wage offer by agent i in
the bargaining game with friction ∆ and a firm type of F . We require that w(F ) is an outcome of
a sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) in the bargaining game as the friction goes to zero for every
F ∈ [0, 1]. In an equilibrium, the firm and the worker make offers such that the value function of
the responder evaluated at the offer is equal to their continuation value. A wage offer associated
with a value less than the continuation value is not accepted, and, given the costly delay, such an
offer is not optimal. Similarly, an offer higher than the continuation value is accepted, but results
in a smaller payoff for the proposer. The following theorem summarizes these results. The proof is
in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique equilibrium in which the two offers, for all F ∈ [0, 1], solve
V (F,wf,∆(F )) = (1−∆)(1−β) V (F,ww,∆(F )) (1)
Π(F,ww,∆(F )) = (1−∆)β Π(F,wf,∆(F )), (2)
and lim∆→0wf,∆(F ) = lim∆→0ww,∆(F ) = w(F ). As the cost of delay goes to zero (∆ → 0), the
two equations yield the differential equation
βΠ(F,w(F ))
∂V (F,w)
∂w
|w=w(F ) + (1− β)V (F,w(F ))
∂Π(F,w)
∂w
|w=w(F ) = 0, (3)
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with the initial condition
βΠ(0, w(0)) = (1− β)V (0, w(0)). (4)
The Nash product is defined by
Π(F,w)1−βV (F,w)β. (5)
In order to see why the bargaining outcome for a given match is unique it is useful to combine
(1) and (2). This shows that the Nash product is the same when evaluated at either the firm’s
or the worker’s offer. (3) implies that the bargaining outcome is such that, the derivative of the
Nash product with respect to the wage is zero. Worker turnover is less for firms of a higher type
as the worker expects a higher wage offer during the renegotiation. The total surplus of a match
is therefore increasing in the firm type, and, for higher types, the contracts last (weakly) longer.
Combining both of these insights implies that if the derivative of the Nash product is zero for one
type, it cannot be zero for a different type (for further discussion see Appendix A). Thus we see that
the inclusion of renegotiation in the model of Shimer (2006) implies that the bargaining outcome
within a match is unique.
Turning to the uniqueness of the distribution. The unique equilibrium in this model is such
that the wage function solves the differential equation in Theorem 1. Where the initial condition
for the differential equation is given by the bargaining outcome that arise if turnover is treated
as fixed. To prove that there is a unique equilibrium, the bargaining game for the lowest firm is
examined. On the interior of the support, the Nash product is a strict local maximum. To have
two offers around the lowest wage, the Nash product must decrease as the wage is lowered below
the support. Outside the support, the Nash product is a concave function. The maximum is at
the wage that corresponds to the bargaining outcome in which turnover is treated as fixed. The
Nash product is increasing in wage outside the support, if the wage is less than this wage. But with
bargaining with OJS, the bargaining outcome is greater than or equal to the bargaining outcome
treating turnover as fixed. There is therefore a unique wage, consistent with bargaining, for which
the Nash product decreases as the wage is lowered.
In Shimer (2006), the Nash product is constant on the support of the wage function. For a
(sufficiently) small probability of breakdown, an offer by the firm and the worker can then be found
on the interior of the support in which the Nash product is the same. The initial value of the
distribution is therefore not determined as both offers are on the support of w(·).6 We have a
6This is similar to the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model where the firms optimal choice of the wage implies a
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unique equilibrium for any positive probability of renegotiation. One might therefore worry about
any discontinuity in the number of equilibria in the limit. Letting the worker make the initial offer,
in Shimer (2006), implies that the offer by the firm will then be outside the support of wages. This
results in a unique equilibrium, for any friction ∆.7
We can now turn to analyzing the properties of the solution. First we can define the match
surplus in the usual way as
S(F,w(F )) = Π(F,w(F )) + V (F,w(F )). (6)
Using the derivative of the value functions we can rewrite the bargaining equation as8
Π(F,w(F )) =
(1− β)
[
1− λw′(F ) δ+ρ+λ(1−F )δ+ρ+γ(F )+λ(1−F )Π(F,w(F ))
]
1− (1− β) λw′(F ) δ+ρ+λ(1−F )δ+ρ+γ(F )+λ(1−F )Π(F,w(F ))
S(F,w(F )) (7)
V (F,w(F )) =
β
1− (1− β) λw′(F ) δ+ρ+λ(1−F )δ+ρ+γ(F )+λ(1−F )Π(F,w(F ))
S(F,w(F )). (8)
Compared to bargaining without OJS, there is an extra term coming from the fact that the
wage endogenously affects turnover. This results in the worker receiving a higher wage. The
lower surplus results in a higher fraction of the surplus going to the worker. The term (1 −
β) λw′(F )
(δ+ρ+λ(1−F ))
δ+ρ+γ(F )+λ(1−F )Π(F,w(F )) captures this effect. The term comprises of the terms captur-
ing the change in the surplus. If the worker leaves for a marginally better firm then the profits
are lost. The turnover is therefore not bilaterally efficient. Thus, by reducing turnover the surplus
increases by the change in turnover multiplied by the level of profits. The change in turnover is
differential equation for the wage function. In order to get the initial condition for the wage function we consider a
deviation below the support of the wage distribution. Such an offer must not be accepted by the worker and it must
therefore be that the worker is indifferent between the lowest wage and unemployment.
7An alternative refinement to Shimer (2006) would be to consider equilibria that are the limit from an arbitrary
large initial friction. With a sufficiently large (inital) friction in Shimer (2006) there is also a unique equilibrium.
Consider a friction such that the offer by the firm falls below the wage that solves (4). The bargaining game implies
that the Nash product evaluated at the offer by the firm’s and the worker’s offer must be the same. Letting the cost
of delay go to zero the offer by the firm and the worker converge to a maximum. The set of wages on the interior of
the support corresponds to this maximum only in case (4) holds, otherwise the bargaining outcome converges to a
point outside the support. Thus an alternative refinement to the model of Shimer (2006) to get a unique equilibrium
would be to consider equilibriums where , for each type, the bargaining outcome must converge to the wage function
for any initial friction as the friction disappears. A global maximum of the Nash product solves (4). If the lowest
wage is higher than the wage that solves (4) then the Nash product is lower on the interior of the support than at
the wage which solves (4).
8Where we use that G′(V (F,w(F ))) = (δ+ρ+λ(1−F ))/w′(F ) and ∂V (F,w)
∂w
|w=w(F ) = (δ + ρ+ γ(F ) + λ(1− F ))−1
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given by the density of incoming wage offers λ/w′(F ) multiplied by the relative length the wage
remains fixed for (δ+ρ+λ(1−F ))δ+ρ+γ(F )+λ(1−F ) . As the length of the contract decreases, the wage becomes less
important, compared to the firm type, for the worker. Thus, as the length of the contract decreases,
turnover becomes less responsive to the wage and workers capture a smaller share of the surplus.
A longer length of the contract thus increases the payoff to the worker. In the limit, as the contract
length goes to zero (γ(F ) → ∞), the Nash product becomes unresponsive. The wage then solves
the standard Nash bargaining solution with perfectly transferable utilities, given by (9) and (10)
below.
Π(F,w(F )) = (1− β)S(F,w(F )) (9)
V (F,w(F )) = βS(F,w(F )). (10)
The model thus provides a justification, based on continuous renegotiation, for using the Nash
bargaining solution in Pissarides (1994). Intuitively, it is only future wages that reduce turnover and
as renegotiation becomes frequent, the current wage becomes irrelevant for future wages. Similarly
as the length of the contract goes to infinity (γ(F )→ 0) and the bargaining powers are symmetric,
the differential equation corresponds to that in Shimer (2006). In the limit, wages are never
renegotiated, and the worker only cares about the wage and not the firm type.
3 Homogeneous productivities
In this section, I impose some restrictions on the general model. Firstly, I assume homogeneous
productivity of the firm (i.e. x(F ) = x > b¯). Secondly, the discounted duration of a wage contract
is a fixed fraction of the expected duration of the job. That is,
γ(F ) =
1− θ
θ
(δ + ρ+ λ(1− F )). (11)
The parameter θ measures the fraction of the discounted duration for which the wage remains fixed.
When θ is one, the model corresponds to the case of no renegotiation, as in Shimer (2006), and the
limit as θ goes to zero corresponds to continuous renegotiation. For this specific model, we have
a closed-form analytical solution. Theorem 2 presents the distribution function, the inverse of the
wage function, and the value functions. The proof is presented in Appendix B.
Theorem 2 The wage offer distribution is given by
F (w) =
(δ + ρ+ λ)
λ
1− [x− w
x− w
]1/θ [
1− (x− w)
1/θ
w − b¯
(
1− β + β/θ
1− β
)
(x− w)1−1/θ − (x− w)1−1/θ
1− 1/θ
] β
θ(1−β)+β
 (12)
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and the value functions are given by
Π(F (w), w) =
x− w
(δ + ρ+ λ)
[
x−w
x−w
]1/θ [
1− (x−w)1/θ
w−b¯
1−β(1−1/θ)
(1−β)
(x−w)1−1/θ−(x−w)1−1/θ
(1−1/θ)
] β
θ(1−β)+β
V (F (w), w) = (w − b¯)
[
1− (x−w)1/θ
w−b¯
(
1−β+β/θ
1−β
)
(x−w)1−1/θ−(x−w)1−1/θ
1−1/θ
]1− β
θ(1−β)+β
(δ + ρ+ λ)
,
where w = β(x− b¯) + b¯.
Theorem 2 extends the solution in Shimer (2006) to incorporate renegotiation and different bar-
gaining powers. I pick parameter values that are typically used for modelling the US economy in
the literature (see Table 1). Furthermore, x and b¯ are normalized to one and zero, respectively. I il-
lustrate the importance of the frequency of renegotiation by varying the frequency of renegotiation.
In Figure 1, I plot the wage function and the value function for different values of the frequency of
renegotiation.
Table 1: Parameters and moments
Value Moment Reference
λu 0.45 45% Monthly job finding rate Shimer (2012)
λ 0.16 3.2% Monthly job-to-job transiton rate Moscarini and Thomsson (2007)
δ 0.0237 5% unemployment rate –
ρ 0.004 5% annual discount rate –
Note: Average job finding rate refers to the period 1948Q1-2007Q1.
The more infrequent the renegotiation, the more the wage function increases with firm type.
The worker’s value function exhibits the same behavior. Worker turnover does not depend on the
frequency of renegotiation but wages decrease if renegotiation becomes more frequent. The profits
are then increasing in the frequency of renegotiation and particularly so for firms of a higher type.
In particular, for sufficiently infrequent renegotiation, profits increase in firm type. If renegotiation
is sufficiently infrequent, profits decrease with firm type. Similarly, if renegotiation becomes more
frequent, the Nash product increases more with the type of the firm. In the case of no renegotiation,
the Nash product is constant (Shimer, 2006). A central question must then be to find an empirically
relevant range of the frequency of renegotiation.
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Figure 1: Functions for β = 0.1
Wage function Profit function
Worker value function Nash product
4 Conclusion
This paper generalizes Shimer’s (2006) model with OJS and bargaining to include renegotiation
and different bargaining powers. Allowing for renegotiation breaks the indeterminacy found by
Shimer (2006). Furthermore, the model nests both Pissarides (1994) and Shimer (2006) as special
cases of continuous renegotiation and no renegotiation, respectively. This paper further provides a
justification for using the Nash bargaining solution with transferable utilities in models with OJS.
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A Theorem 1
I prove Theorem 1 using a number of lemmas. Define the equilibrium value function as
V¯ (F ) = V (F,w (F )) and Π¯ (F ) = Π (F,w (F ))
It is useful to define the wage w(F, V ) which gives the worker excess value V when matched with
a firm of type F . The derivative of the workers value function with respect to the wage when
matched with a type F firm is strictly positive and equals
∂V (F,w)
∂w
|w=w(F,V ) =
1
(δ + ρ+ γ (F ) + λ(1−G(V ))) .
Let x¯ (F ) denote the wage that gives the firm zero profits and b¯ (F ) denote the wage that makes
the worker indifferent between unemployment and being matched to a type F .
Lemma 1 Neither x¯ (F ) nor b¯ (F ) is a bargaining outcome.
Proof. The highest possible continuation value for the worker matched to a type F firm is the
value function associated with the wage of x¯ (F ). The value function for the worker is differentiable
in the wage. This means that, for any ∆, there exists an  such that an offer of x¯ (F )−  is strictly
preferred by the worker compared to waiting one period to get x¯ (F ). Markov strategies imply that
any offer that results in a higher value than the continuation payoff will be accepted. Such an offer
must therefore be accepted and yield a strictly positive payoff for the firm. Then, an offer x¯ (F )
cannot be accepted by the firm, as the firm would get a strictly positive payoff by rejecting and
then offering x¯ (F )− . The same argument applies to b¯ (F ).
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, all offers are accepted. Furthermore, the worker’s and the firm’s offers
must converge as ∆→ 0.
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Proof. First, I exclude the possibility that no agreement is ever reached. If no agreement is
reached, then for all ∆, there exist some  > 0 such that an offer of b¯ (F ) +  by the firm must be
accepted. (Note that b¯ (F ) = b¯ is the outside value of the worker). The firm then has a profitable
deviation, as such an offer would yield positive profits to the firm (given the assumption x(0) > b¯).
Thus, an agreement must be reached for all F .
Suppose that the equilibrium features agreement at a wage w. Then, the proposer when agree-
ment is reached would accept w as the continuation value is lower given the cost of delay. This
means that it cannot be optimal for the responder to offer an unacceptable wage, since this would
be dominated by offering w. Thus, all offers are accepted. The worker’s value function is strictly
increasing in the wage, which implies that, if the two offers do not converge as the probability of
breakdown disappears, the worker would reject the lower offer. Declining the lower offer would
imply that there are no agreement after both offers.
Lemma 3 In the equilibrium, the profit function is strictly decreasing in the wage offered by the
worker and weakly decreasing in the wage offered by the firm.
Proof. First, we note that, at both the firm’s and the worker’s offer, the profit function is weakly
decreasing in the wage. If the profit function would be strictly increasing at an offer, both the firm
and the worker would gain from a higher wage. A higher wage would must then be accepted and is
preferred by either party. This also rules out any mass points on the distribution, as a mass point
means that the turnover effect dominates the decreased markup.
Thus it only remains to show that the profit function is strictly decreasing in worker’s offers. I
show this by contradiction. Suppose that the derivative with respect to wage of the profit function
is zero at the offer made by the firm. We know that the profit function is eventually decreasing
(as the turnover effect disappears outside the support). Thus, the worker offers a higher wage that
yields Π− (where Π denotes the continuation value).9 For  sufficiently small, such an offer will be
acceptable. The offer by the worker must therefore always be at a point where the profit function
is strictly decreasing in the wage.
Lemma 3 implies that, at the bargaining outcome, the profit function is strictly (weakly) de-
creasing in the region above (below) the bargaining outcome.
9Since there is no mass point on the distribution the profit function is continuous.
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Lemma 4 If the profit function is locally strictly decreasing in the wage at the offers, then the
offers satisfy
V (F,wf,∆ (F )) = (1−∆)(1−β) V (F,ww,∆ (F )) (13)
Π (F,ww,∆ (F )) = (1−∆)β Π (F,wf,∆ (F )) . (14)
As the probability of breakdown goes to zero, (13) and (14) yield the differential equation
βΠ (F,w (F ))
∂V (F,w)
∂w
|w=w(F ) + (1− β)V (z, w (F ))
∂Π (F,w)
∂w
|w=w(F ) = 0. (15)
Proof. Since the worker’s value function is globally strictly increasing in the wage, the worker will
offer the highest wage such that the firm is indifferent. Because the profit function is continuous
and strictly decreasing, such a wage exist. Because the profit function is strictly decreasing, the
wage is locally unique. This gives the necessary conditions
V (F,wf,∆ (F )) = (1−∆)(1−β) V (F,ww,∆ (F )) (16)
Π (F,ww,∆ (F )) = (1−∆)β Π (F,wf,∆ (F )) . (17)
If there were an inequality then an offer that is  higher (lower) by the worker (firm) would be
accepted since the worker’s value function and firm’s profit function are continuous. As the worker’s
(firm’s) value function is increasing (decreasing), such an offer is preferred. Taking the limit as the
probability of breakdown goes to zero (∆→ 0), we obtain (15).
Lemma 5 The profit function is strictly decreasing in the offer by both players.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 3, we showed that the profit function is decreasing in the offer
by the worker. The profit function must therefore be decreasing to the right at the bargaining
outcome. Suppose that there exists a type F¯ such that the profit function is flat as the wage is
lowered below w(F¯ ). Denote V ∈ (Vu, V (F )] to be the interval of the worker’s value function where
the profit function is constant for type F¯ . The wage w(F, V ) is given by
(δ + ρ+ λ+ γ (F ))(V − V¯ (F )) = w (F, V )− w (F ) + λ ∫ 10 (max{V, V¯ (F˜ )} −max{V¯ (F ) , V¯ (F˜ )}) dF˜
The functions {γ (F ) , w (F ) , V¯ (F )} are continuous in F and therefore so is w (F, V ). The profit
function is given by
(δ + ρ+ γ (F ) + λ(1−G(V )))Π (F,w (F, V )) = x (F )− w (F, V ) + γ (F ) Π (F,w (F ))
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All functions in the expression are continuous in F and so is the profit function. The profit function
is differentiable in the region (Vu, V (F )) with derivative at V given by
∂Π (F,w)
∂w
|w=w(F,V ) = −
1
(δ + ρ+ γ (F ) + λ(1−G(V ))) +
λG′(V )Π (F,w (F, V ))
(δ + ρ+ γ (F ) + λ(1−G(V )))2
This derivative is zero for type F¯ . The effect of decreased turnover exactly matches the increased
cost for a type F firm. The profit function Π (F,w (F )) is therefore strictly positive. The function
G(V ) is differentiable in the region, (Vu, V (F )), which implies that, for types that offer wages in
the interval, the left and the right derivatives of the profit function are the same.
By Lemma 3, the right derivative with respect to the wage has to be negative. The profit
function must therefore be strictly decreasing in the wage. By Lemma 4, the bargaining equation
must then hold with equality. Denote F −  to be a type that offers a wage corresponding to this
interval of worker’s value function. Note that the derivative of the profit function is continuous in
F . The left limit of the derivative is then equal to the value, which is zero. By the bargaining
equation, it has to be that the derivative of the worker’s value function (∂V (F−,w)∂w |w=w(F−)) goes to
zero. But the derivative of the worker’s value function is bounded below by 1/(δ+ρ+γ(F − )+λ)
and we can therefore reject that the profit function is flat in some part below the wage outcome.
I now prove that there is a unique bargaining outcome for each type. The proof is presented in
two steps. First I show that the Nash product is increasing and then decreasing on the support of
values. I then show that the Nash product is only decreasing outside the support if (4) holds.
Lemma 6 The profit function is strictly greater for a higher type evaluated at the equilibrium
worker value function for either of the types (see (18)).
Π (F,w (F, V )) > Π(F ′, w(F ′, V )) if V = V¯ (F ′) or V = V¯ (F ) and F ′ < F (18)
Proof. After renegotiation, the worker’s value function is strictly greater at F than F ′. That is,
V¯ (F ) > V¯ (F ′). There exists F˜ such that V¯ (F ′) < V¯ (F˜ ) < V¯ (F ). The quit rate is therefore strictly
less (G(V¯ (F )) > G(V¯ (F ′))). For these intermediate quits, the worker’s value of remaining in a
match at F is greater than the worker’s value from quitting. The profit is also strictly positive at
F . The total surplus, V (F,w(F, V )) + Π(F,w(F, V )), is therefore greater under F than F ′. Since
the worker’s value is the same V , the profits must be greater.
Lemma 7 No two types pay the same wage and the Nash product is strictly decreasing (increasing)
below (above) w (F ) on the interior of the support of values.
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Proof. The derivative of the (log) Nash product is
A(F, F ′)
[
β
V (F ′)
+
[
∂V (F,w(F, V¯ (F ′)))
∂w
|w=w(F,V¯ (F ′))
]−1
1− β
Π(F,w(F, V¯ (F ′)))
∂Π(F,w(F, V¯ (F ′)))
∂w
|w=w(F,V¯ (F ′))
]
,
where A(F, F ′) =
[
∂V (F,w(F,V¯ (F ′)))
∂w |w=w(F,V¯ (F ′))
]2
. Substituting for the derivative of the value
functions we get
A(F, F ′)
[
β
V¯ (F ′)
− (1− β)
[
1
Π(F,w(F, V¯ (F ′)))
− λ(δ + ρ+ λ(1− F
′))
(δ + ρ+ γ(F ) + λ(1− F ′))
1
w′(F )
]]
.
Note that, −Π(F,w(F, V¯ (F ′))) and γ(F ) are strict greater (less) at F than F ′ if F is strictly greater
(less) than F ′. The term is therefore smaller for F < F ′ and greater for F > F ′ than for F = F ′.
So if the expression holds for F ′ at V¯ (F ′) it can not hold for F 6= F ′. Furthermore, if it holds
at V¯ (F ′) for F ′, the equation has to be strictly positive (negative) for F at V¯ (F ′) if F is strictly
greater (less). This implies that, on the interior of the support, the Nash product is increasing
before the bargaining outcome zero at and decreasing thereafter.
We know that the two offers must imply the same Nash product. On the interior of the support,
for the lowest type, the Nash product decreases as wage is raised. In order to find an offer around
the lowest wage we therefore require that the Nash product decreases as the wage is lowered outside
the support.
Lemma 8 The bargaining outcome is weakly greater than the bargaining outcome that treats turnover
as fixed.
Proof. The derivative of the Nash product is
β
V¯ (F )
− (1− β)
[
1
Π(F,w(F, V¯ (F )))
− λ(δ + ρ+ λ(1− F ))
(δ + ρ+ γ(F ) + λ(1− F ))
1
w′(F )
]
The effect of OJS is captured in the term
λ(δ + ρ+ λ(1− F ))
(δ + ρ+ γ(F ) + λ(1− F ))
Π(F,w(F, V¯ (F ′)))
w′(F )
,
which reflects how the joint surplus changes with the wage. The lower turnover associated with a
higher wage implies that the derivative of the Nash product is greater. As the derivative of Nash
product is zero at the wage outcome, the bargaining outcome is weakly greater than had turnover
been treated as fixed.
Lemma 9 The Nash product decreases as the wage decreases or increases out of the support of
wages if and only if
βΠ(0, w(0, V¯ (0))) = (1− β)V¯ (0) (19)
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Proof. (19) solves for the maximum of the Nash product outside the support. If the wage is
higher than this wage, the Nash product increases as the wage is lowered. For the Nash product
to be decreasing at the lowest wage, we require (19) to hold. By Lemma 8, we know that the
wage outcome is weakly greater than the wage treating turnover as fixed. The Nash product must
therefore decreases above the highest wage.
The derivative of the Nash product is strictly positive before w(F ), zero at w(F ), and strictly
negative thereafter. The profits are decreasing in the wage. In a bargaining equilibrium, we
therefore require that (1) and (2) are satisfied. For any F , two offers can be found around w(F )
for which this is the case. The offers converge to w(F ) as the friction goes to zero. If (3) does not
hold at a particular wage, that wage is not a bargaining outcome. Similarly, if (4) does not hold,
the lowest wage is not a bargaining outcome.
B Theorem 2
Differentiating with respect to the wage gives
Vw(F,w)|w=w(F ) =
1
(δ + ρ+ γ (F ) + λ(1− F ))
(δ + ρ+ γ (F ) + λ(1−G(V (F,w (F )))))Πw(F,w) = −1 + λGV (V (F,w))Vw(F,w)Π(F,w),
where we use the following
GV (V (F,w(F )))Vw(F,w)|w=w(F ) =
∂V (F,w)
∂w
|w=w(F )
[
∂V (F,w(F ))
∂F
]−1
=
1
w′(F )
θ
The differential equation given by the bargaining game is
βΠ(F,w(F ))Vw(F,w)|w=w(F ) + (1− β)Πw(F,w)|w=w(F )V (F,w(F )) = 0 (20)
Rewriting it in terms of wages using F (wˆ) = w−1(wˆ) and solving the differential equation gives the
solution.
F (w) =
(δ + ρ+ λ)
λ
1− [x− w
x− w
]1/θ [
1− (x− w)
1/θ
w − b¯
(
1− β + β/θ
1− β
)
(x− w)1−1/θ − (x− w)1−1/θ
1− 1/θ
] β
θ(1−β)+β
 (21)
Using the distribution function, we can solve for the profit function as
Π(F (w), w) =
x− w
(δ + ρ+ λ)
[
x−w
x−w
]1/θ [
1− (x−w)1/θ
w−b¯
1−β(1−1/θ)
(1−β)
(x−w)1−1/θ−(x−w)1−1/θ
(1−1/θ)
] β
θ(1−β)+β
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The value function of the worker is
V (F (w), w) =
∫ w
w
1
(δ + ρ+ λ)
[
x−w
x−w
]1/θ [
1− (x−w)1/θ
w−b¯
1−β(1−1/θ)
(1−β)
(x−w)1−1/θ−(x−w)1−1/θ
(1−1/θ)
] β
θ(1−β)+β
dw +
w− b¯
(δ + ρ+ λ)
= (w − b¯)
[
1− (x−w)1/θ
w−b¯
(
1−β+β/θ
1−β
)
(x−w)1−1/θ−(x−w)1−1/θ
1−1/θ
]1− β
θ(1−β)+β
(δ + ρ+ λ)
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